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PRECE-DON'T: CORPORATIONS AND THE RISE
OF THE MODERN JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP
Justin Levitt*
"And there could be an argument made that that was the Court's error
to start with, not Austin or McConnell, but the fact that the Court im-
bued a creature of State law with human characteristics."'
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission,2 declared unconstitutional any law forbidding
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for "elec-
tioneering communication," or political advocacy transmitted by
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication in the period leading up to
a federal election.3 In so doing, the Supreme Court overruled its prior
decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce4 and parts of a
later case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.5 Non-profit or-
ganizations like Citizens United, as well as- unions and for-profit
corporations, now have the freedom to spend money from their general
treasuries on electioneering communications with no fear of criminal
penalties. 6 On its face, the case seems to be a victory for freedom of
speech and a bulwark against oppressive government censorship.7 "If
the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining
or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in
2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. Id. at 886.
4. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding provisions of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act,
which prohibited corporations from using their general treasury funds on independent
expenditures in support of or in opposition to any candidate running for any state office),
overruled by Citizens United, v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, which made it a felony for a political party or corporation to use soft money in issue
ads, similar in effect to the Michigan Campaign Finance Act), overruled by Citizens United,
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
6. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (West) (defining electioneering communications as "any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office" and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election).
7. CITIZENS UNITED, www.citizensunited.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (describing
the non-profit group's battle against the government as "David v. Goliath").
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political speech."8 Justice Kennedy's interpretation should be reassur-
ing to the American people, at least to the numerous associations of
people, like corporations, but in most circles it has had the opposite
effect, stirring suspicions of foul play and rousing fears of a new wave
of unchecked corruption in American politics.
By upholding a state statute prohibiting corporate independent
expenditures, the Austin Court had, according to Justice Kennedy's
logic, put millions of corporations in jeopardy of being silenced by op-
pressive government censorship.9 The Austin Court's justification for
such a restriction on speech, that "corporate wealth can unfairly influ-
ence elections" even in the form of independent expenditures' 0 was the
compelling government interest at the foundation of the McCain-Fein-
gold Act.11 By striking down Austin's ban on corporate independent
expenditures the Citizens Court effectively saved the open "market
place of ideas," which the First Amendment was designed to protect.12
Now corporations can spend unlimited money buying airspace for a va-
riety of political advertisements and electioneering communications,
thus keeping the open market place of ideas robust and informative.
In the twenty years between Austin and Citizens, the open market
place of ideas had ostensibly suffered because corporations could no
longer use their immense accumulations of wealth to flood the air-
waves with political ads.
As David Bossie, the CEO of Citizens said in a recent interview,
the majority "[was] trying to right a wrong that they felt was on the
books."'8 Employing some "results oriented" jurisprudence, the Citi-
zens United majority reinstated two recently established principles
that Austin had allegedly overlooked, that money is functionally
equivalent to speechl 4 and that First Amendment protection does not
8. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
9. Id. (the majority uses the phrase "associations of citizens" interchangeably with
corporations).
10. Id.
11. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (2002) (see infra part
IV.A for further discussion).
12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
13. See C-SPAN, interview on Super Pacs and the 2012 Campaign, (Feb. 12, 2010),
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Csan.
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("A restriction on the amount of money a
person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every
means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.").
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depend on the identity of the speech's source.15 The result effectively
prevents a hostile government from suppressing the political dialogue
preceding an election.16
With the unelected guardians of our constitutional rights hard
at work, why has there been so much controversy surrounding the deci-
sion? In his scathing dissent, Justice Stevens condemned the majority
and expressed deep concern with their approach and its potential dele-
terious effect on the integrity of the court.17 Aware of the clarity and
depth that would be required to rebut the majority's, at times, convo-
luted argument, Justice Stevens began with, "I regret the length of
what follows, but the importance and novelty of the Court's opinion
require a full response. . .I emphatically dissent from its principal hold-
ing."18 The dissent then explicated in great detail three fundamental
issues with the majority's approach: their "procedural dereliction,"
their disregard for stare decisis and their ruling, or lack of thereof, on
the merits.19 President Obama also expressed concern in his 2010 state
of the union address, eight days after the decision came out, when he
said, "The Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will
open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations
to spend without limit in our elections."20 Each of these concerns will
be explored in detail below, but first it is interesting to note the direc-
tion of the public discourse in the aftermath of Citizens United and to
point out where it misses the point.
Citizens United and all of its 'corporate money-corrupting-polit-
ics' implications have fascinated a segment of popular culture. One
notable and boisterous personality is Stephen Colbert, host, writer and
15. First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.").
16. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
17. Id. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's ruling threatens to undermine the
integrity of elected institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its
outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution. Before turning to the question whether to
overrule Austin and part of McConnell, it is important to explain why the Court should not
be deciding that question.").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The novelty of the Court's procedural
dereliction and its approach to stare decisis is matched by the novelty of its ruling on the
merits.").
20. Mary Hall, State of the Union: Obama Walking in the Footsteps of FDR,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-hall/state-of-the-
union-obama b_447056.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012); See also Alito Caught Reacting to
Obama Remarks? (ABC Television News Broadcast), available at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NfCDme-Z9Fc&feature=fvsr (Showing the majority democratic congress erupt in
standing ovation in response to the President, while Justice Alito visibly reacts).
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producer of the Colbert Report.21 In the wake of Citizens United, Ste-
phen Colbert has aired dozens of episodes satirizing its implications,
including one which aired on January 27, 2010, lampooning Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts for his blatant disregard of precedent. 2 2 The show
has also aired numerous segments on Super Political Action Commit-
tees (hereinafter "Super PACS")23 and has documented Stephen
Colbert's journey in the formation of his own Super PAC. 2 4
A recurring theme in many of these segments is that corpora-
tions are now equal to natural persons under the constitution and are
therefore entitled to the same protections under the law as natural
persons. 25 The community of legal scholars seems to be fixated on this
idea of corporate personhood as well. A cursory search in Westlaw Next
reveals over 800 law review articles written in just the two years since
Citizens United was decided.2 6 The topics are diverse and wide rang-
21. See Deborah Solomon, Questions for Stephen Colbert, Funny About the News, N. Y.
Times (Sept. 25, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/magazine/25ques
tions.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (Stephen Colbert describes his character as a "well
intentioned, poorly informed, high status idiot."). See also www.colbertnation.com).
22. http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/262612/january-27-2010/
the-word--prece-don-t (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) (In a segment entitled "Prece-don't"
Colbert is thankful that, "Chief Justice John Roberts has a brilliant legal strategy to get
around following precedent-not following precedent!").
23. See http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Feb
19, 2012) (Super PAC, also known as an independent expenditure-only committees, can
raise unlimited amounts of money from corporations, individuals, and other associations of
individuals to spend on overt advocacy ads. They must report their donors to the FEC on
other a quarterly or monthly basis and are prohibited from donating money directly to
candidates). (See e.g., SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir.
2010) cert. denied.
24. Searching "Super PAC" or "Trevor Potter" (Stephen Colbert's attorney and former
FEC chairmen) on www.colbernation.com revealed 19 episodes making some reference to
Super PACs. See e.g. http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/379369/march-
30-2011/colbert-pac--trevor-potter (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (Stephen Colbert discusses
starting his own Super PAC with his attorney); See also http://www.colbertsuperpac.com/
for general information relating to Colbert's Super PAC.
25. See e.g. http://www.colbertsuperpac.com/episodeiv-anewhope/index.php (last
visited Feb. 18, 2012) (A commercial put out by the Colbert Super PAC advocating against
Mitt Romney for president asserted that because Romney believes corporations are people
and because he has been responsible for some companies going bankrupt he is a serial
killer; See also http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/406409/january-19-
2012/colbert-super-pac--john-paul-stevens, (last visited Feb 18, 2012) (During an interview
with retired Supreme Court Justice Stevens, Colbert said, "We all know it is long
established law that corporations are people. . ." to which Justice Stevens responded, "For
some purposes corporations are persons." The retired Justice's point is essentially the thesis
of part I).
26. Using Westlaw Next's advanced search feature, with the date parameter set to
"after 1-1-2010" and the exact phrase "citizens united." (last visited Feb 18, 2012) (compared
to only 62 law review articles written in the same interval of time after Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 8:1:157
ing, but one topic seems to come up more than others, corporate
personhood, with at least sixty articles addressing the issue from some
angle. 27 The public discourse regarding the constitutional rights of
corporations has been primed, and debate is flourishing across the
country. Citizen advocacy groups have created websites pushing for an
amendment to the constitution removing corporate personhood. 28 This
is, without a doubt, a step in the right direction. Considering how ill-
informed and apathetic the average citizen is, any conversation bring-
ing attention to such a controversial issue is good. However, the focus
on eliminating corporate personhood is a distraction and unlikely to
effectuate any real change.
This note will examine the implications of the Citizens United
decision and will argue that the future of First Amendment protection
of corporate speech does not turn on any notion of corporate per-
sonhood. It will explore exactly how the Court has applied the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations. It will
re-examine the infamous Santa Clara headnote and the genesis of the
legal community's flawed perception of corporate personhood. Part II
will break down the Citizens Court's approach and will show how the
majority could have reached the same result without overturning per-
fectly good law. Part II will also illustrate the majority's pro-business
bias and its role in their analysis. Part III will discuss the implications
of the decision on campaign finance laws as they relate to corporations
owned by foreign nationals. It will explore how the various campaign
finance laws, starting with Tillman Act of 1907 through the McCain-
Feingold amendments of 2002, have treated multinational corpora-
tions and how Citizens may change everything. As an academic
exercise, Part IV will briefly extend the Citizen Court's logic to second
amendment protection of a corporation's right to bear arms. The note
will conclude with a warning, echoing Justice Stevens' concerns re-
garding the lack of judicial restraint and the future of the Court.
I. FALSE ORIGINS OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
A corporation is and should be considered a person under the
law for some purposes. Examining early Supreme Court jurisprudence
on corporate personhood reveals that the constitutional protections,
27. Same search parameters as above, with the additional phrase "corporate
personhood."
28. See, e.g., http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3264 (last
visited Feb. 19, 2012); See also http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood (last visited Feb. 19,
2012) (containing a draft for a proposed amendment).
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which corporations have come to enjoy, originated from a property
rights framework.29 It is often claimed that Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Co. 3 0 was the first case to grant corporations
Fourteenth Amendment protection and therefore was the genesis of
corporate personhood. 3 ' However, this is a misguided read of Santa
Clara. Deciding the case on narrower grounds, the Court never ruled
on the constitutional issue of whether corporations were persons or
not.32 Unable to rely on any rationale supporting the conclusion that
corporations are indeed people under the Fourteenth Amendment
(since none was proffered), creative corporate attorneys have clung to
Justice Waite's declaration from the bench that,
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether
the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We
are all of opinion that it does.33
Most legal scholars agree that this proposition is not the law since the
Court made no mention of corporate personhood again.34
While it is true that Justice Waite's statement cannot be the
law, it is not necessarily wrong. Proper context is required. In The
Railroad Tax Cases,35 decided four years before Santa Clara County,
Justice Field said:
It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision in-
tended for the protection of every person against partial and
discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such
protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corpora-
tion. . .On the contrary, we think that it is well established. . .that
whenever a provision of the constitution, or of a law, guaranties to
29. Daniel Lipton, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: Defining Corporate
Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1940 (2010) (The
article asserts that, "instead of rooting corporate personhood in abstract concepts of group
personality or artificial theory, the courts grounded the corporate entity in the familiar
category of property.").
30. 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (This case involved a tax dispute between the railroad and
Santa Clara County. The railroad company conceded that taxes were owed but argued the
State Board was without jurisdiction to assess the tax.).
31. Lipton, supra note 30, at 1941.
32. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 416 (The Court accepted the railroad's argument that the
board lacked jurisdiction to assess the tax and declared, "As the judgment can be sustained
upon this ground, it is not necessary to consider any other questions. .
33. Id. at 396.
34. See, e.g., THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: How CORPORATIONs BECAME
"PEOPLE"-AND How You CAN FIGHT BACK 25-32 (2 ed. 2010). (See generally discussion in
Chapter 1, p. 25-32).
35. 13 F. 722 (1882) (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (another tax dispute).
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persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to them means for its
[the property's] protection, or prohibits legislation injuriously affect-
ing it [property], the benefits of the provision extend to
corporations. . .36
Justice Field's unambiguous elucidation on the role of the Fourteenth
Amendment in protecting a corporation's property interests implicitly
introduced the notion of corporate personhood for the first time, albeit
in an extremely limited context. It is logical to assume that Justice
Waite was actually relying on the analytical framework that "corporate
property was to be treated no differently than individual [property] "3
just recently established by his colleague.
A. Hale v. Henkel - Personal Rights Versus
Safeguarding Property Interests
In Hale v Henkel,38 twenty years after Santa Clara, the major-
ity had another opportunity to explicitly declare corporations people,
but chose not to do so. The Court held that the individual witness, in
his capacity as corporate officer, could not assert the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against self-incrimination on behalf of the
corporation because the right against self-incrimination was "purely a
personal privilege of the witness [and] never intended to permit him
to" assert that some third party or corporation, "might be incriminated
by his testimony."39 However, the Court did find that the Fourth
Amendment protects a corporation's property interests against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The Court reasoned:
A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing
itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities ap-
propriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of
law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful
discrimination. 40
36. Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
37. Daniel Lipton, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: Defining Corporate
Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1942 (2010).
38. 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (a corporate officer tried to assert Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable search and seizure and Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination on behalf of the corporation).
39. Hale, 201 U.S. at 69.
40. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
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Hale is a textbook example of Justice Field's framework laid out in the
Railroad Tax Case.41 Twenty years after Santa Clara, the Court had
yet to entertain any explicit notions of corporations as natural persons.
Instead, corporations were extended limited constitutional protections
appropriate only to safeguard their perpetual property interests. This
protection makes sense, considering the primary purpose of a corpora-
tion is to aggregate wealth and property in order to further some
capitalistic endeavor. 4 2
B. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary Acknowledges The Property Interests
of Private Businesses
Another opportunity where the Court could have unequivocally
declared corporations to be people, but instead continued to use prop-
erty rights to justify the application of the Fourteenth Amendment,
came twenty years after Hale, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.43 Discussed in every first year consti-
tutional law class, this case is known for declaring that a parent's right
to choose how to educate their child is a fundamental right protected
by the due process clause. 44 In Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, the ap-
pellees were private educational institutions organized as corporations
under the law. In addition to alleging that compulsory education vio-
lated the rights of parents to choose how their children were educated,
the institutions argued that compulsory education also violated "the
41. 13 F. 722 (1882) (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
42. See generally Austin at 658-9; See also Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,
17 U.S. 518, 636, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819) ("A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best
calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a
perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single
individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property,
without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual
conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the
purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that
corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of
individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one
immortal being.")
43. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
44. Id. at 534 (discusses "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control." Here the Court applied the doctrine of Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which held the right of parents to control the upbringing
of their children was protected by substantive due process).
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right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business."45
The Court agreed concluding:
Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, they cannot
claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. Northwestern
Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 255, 27 S. Ct. 126, 51 L. Ed.
168, 7 Ann. Cas. 1104; Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204
U. S. 359, 363, 27 S. Ct. 384, 51 L. Ed. 520. But they have business
and property for which they claim protection. These are threatened
with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appel-
lants are exercising over present and prospective patrons of their
schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss
threatened by such action.46
C. Bellotti - Protecting Speech Regardless of Who is Speaking
The Society of Sisters case makes clear that the Court did not
use corporate personhood as explicit justification for extending Four-
teenth Amendment protections to corporations, and Citizens United47
did not suddenly change this paradigm. For another fifty years, the
Court continued extending Fourth Amendment protections to corpora-
tions under a property rights analysis until its 1976 decision in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.48 For the first time in history, the
Bellotti Court extended First Amendment protections to corporations
based on the inherent nature of the speech itself rather than on any
identifiable property interest.4 9
Rejecting the notion that corporations could expend general
treasury funds only on those matters that materially affected their
business interests, the real question according to the Court, was
whether the statute abridged the type of expression in which the First
Amendment was meant to protect, not whether corporations shared
the same first amendment protections as natural persons.50 In fact the
45. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. at 532.
46. Id. at 535 (see, e.g. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 (1915); Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U. S. 312 (1921); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1975).
47. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
48. 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (the banking plaintiffs challenged a Massachusetts
statute which prohibited corporations from expending funds to publicize their views on a
referendum matter unless the referendum matter 'materially affect[ted]' a corporation's
'property, business or assets.'). See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass.
773, 359 N.E. 2d 1262 (1977) rev'd sub nom. See also First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed. 2d 707 (1978).
49. Id. at 776.
50. Id. at 778.
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court declined to address this issue,5 1 reasoning that certain constitu-
tional protections were purely personal in nature and therefore
unavailable to corporations because the historic function of the consti-
tutional right had been limited to the individual. 52 Determining
whether a particular protection is purely personal or unavailable to the
corporation because of some other reason depends on the nature, his-
tory and purpose of the particular constitutional protection.53 Since the
nature, history, and purpose of the First Amendment was to protect
the free flow of information in an open market place, it is not purely
personal in nature.54
II. CITIZENS UNITED
"The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to
natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also
inadequate to justify the Court's disposition of this case."55 No case has
ever declared that corporations are entitled the same rights as natural
persons. It is clear from the jurisprudence on the subject that focusing
on corporate personhood loses sight of the real issues: results oriented
jurisprudence and judicial activism. So what did Citizens United do if it
did not declare that corporations are people for the purpose of First
and Fourteenth Amendment protections? Citizens United held that,
"the Government may regulate corporate political speech through dis-
claimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that
speech altogether."56 In reality, by overturning Austin,5 7 the Court
struck down section 441(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
200258 which prohibited corporations from funneling unlimited money
from their general treasury through a "segregated fund established by
51. The fact that the court explicitly acknowledged its refusal to address the issue
clearly indicates that the question has yet to be fully settled.
52. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 783.
55. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
56. Id. at 886 (This is quite an overstatement, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his
dissent, "Neither Citizens United's nor any other corporation's speech has been 'banned,'
ante, at 886. All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the
funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period." Id. at 929
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
57. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990).
58. More commonly referred to as McCain-Feingold.
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a corporation,"5 or SuperPAC,6o in direct advocacy for or against a
candidate for federal office.61
A. Austin's Compelling Interest and a New Defintion of Corruption
Austin provided the underlying justification, the government's
compelling interest, at the foundation of future prohibitions against
corporate expenditures. 62 Its principal holding was that the govern-
ment has a compelling interest in "eliminating from the political
process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests' amassed with the
aid of the legal advantages given to corporations."63 The Austin Court
recognized that, although money was speech, there was a legitimate
justification for regulating corporate spending. Preventing corruption,
or even the appearance thereof, in order to maintain the citizenry's
confidence in the democratic process, was compelling enough to war-
rant this slight restriction of a corporation's speech rights. Viewed
with this in mind Citizens did more to modify the definition of corrup-
tion than to revolutionize notions of corporate personhood. 64
The importance of the Austin holding cannot be overstated.
With its definition of corruption eviscerated, most of McCain-Feingold
no longer had a leg to stand on. While the practical implications of this
outcome may be troubling, what is more concerning is how the court
reached this conclusion. As David Bossie said, "they [the majority]
were trying to right a wrong they felt was on the books."65 In so doing,
the Court encroached into the purview of Congress, and instead of in-
59. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(4)(A)(i) (West 2012).
60. See supra text accompanying note 24.
61. § 441(b)(4)(A)(i).
62. See generally Citizens United at 922-923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("It should not
be surprising then, that Members of the Court have relied on Austin's expansive logic to
justify greater incursions on the First Amendment, even outside the original context of
corporate advocacy on behalf of candidates running for office.") See, e.g., Davis v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2780 (2008) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (used Austin to justify restrictions on campaign spending by individual
candidates); See also McConnell at 203-209 (extended Austin to cover both the "functional
equivalent" of express advocacy by corporations and also electioneering speech conducted by
labor unions).
63. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666.
64. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) ("This Court now
concludes that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. That speakers may have influence over or
access to elected officials does not mean that those officials are corrupt.").
65. See CSPAN interview, supra note 14.
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terpreting the constitution it substituted its definition of corruption for
that of the peoples', through their elected representatives. 66
B. Judicial Activism And The Facial Challenge That Never Was
What led the majority to this flawed decision? Clearly commit-
ted ahead of time to overturning Austin, the Court took it upon itself to
tackle the broader constitutional question, which had not been raised
on appeal. This approach marked a significant departure from recent
case law which proclaimed, "partial rather than facial invalidation is
the required course."67 In fact Justice Kennedy himself affirmed this
practice in Gonzales v. Carhart, decided just three years earlier.68
Writing for the same conservative majority which decided Citizens, he
explained, "it is neither our obligation nor within our traditional role to
resolve questions of constitutionality with respect to each potential sit-
uation that might develop. . .for this reason as-applied challenges are
the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication."69 In Citizens,
however, Justice Kennedy viewed these "basic building blocks of con-
stitutional adjudication" as either insignificant or he forgot about them
outright. There he explained that "the distinction between facial and
as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic
effect or that it must always control. . ."7o The real question is whether
this is an example of biased judicial advocacy or just an innocent illus-
tration of how malleable the law can often be.7 1
66. See generally Citizens United at 908-11 ("A single footnote in Bellotti purported to
leave open the possibility that corporate independent expenditures could be shown to cause
corruption. 435 U.S., at 788, n. 26, 98 S.Ct. 1407. For the reasons explained above, we now
conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption."); See also Citizens United at 928 (Scalia
J., concurring)("In passing, the dissent also claims that the Court's conception of corruption
is unhistorical . . . Moreover, if speech can be prohibited because, in the view of the
Government, it leads to 'moral decay' or does not serve 'public ends,' then there is no limit to
the Government's censorship power.").
67. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (quoting Brockett v Spokane arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
291, 504 (1985)).
68. 550 U.S. 124, 127 (2007).
69. Id. at 168 (quoting Richard Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-
Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321, at 1328 (2000)).
70. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (it is interesting to note that Justice Kennedy relies
on Fallon, supra note 63, to diminish the authority of his previous exposition on the basic
building blocks of constitutional adjudication) ("Once a case is brought, no general
categorical line bars a court form making broader pronouncements of invalidity in properly
'as-applied' cases") (quoting Fallon, at 1327, 1328).
71. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholder55tgs of County of Burlington, 132 S.
Ct. 1510 (2012); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).
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The results oriented sentiment becomes more obvious by Chief
Justice Robert's declaration in his concurrence that, "If there were a
valid basis for deciding this statutory claim in Citizens United's favor
(and thereby avoiding constitutional adjudication), it would be proper
to do so. . ."72 This certainly does not sound like words from an objec-
tive arbiter charged with impartially administering justice. If the
majority was so insistent on ruling in favor of the nonprofit company
the case could have been decided as narrowly as possible and on the
merits of a claim properly brought before the court.
Eager to overturn Austin and in the process, strike down sec-
tion 441(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Justice
Kennedy and the majority glossed over Citizen United's narrower argu-
ments and chose to tackle the question of the statute's facial
constitutionality, which had been dropped two years ago at the district
court level. Justice Stevens was quick to point out that, "It is only in
exceptional cases. . .that questions not pressed or passed upon below
are reviewed." 73 Neither the appellant nor the majority identified an
exceptional circumstance warranting such a procedural deviation. 74
Chief Justice Roberts attempted to justify this sua sponte facial chal-
lenge by stating that:
Given the nature of that claim.. .it makes no difference of any sub-
stance whether this case is resolved by invalidating the statute on
its face or only as applied to Citizens United. Even if considered in
as-applied terms, a holding in this case that the Act may not be
applied to Citizens United-because corporations as well as individu-
als enjoy the pertinent First Amendment rights-would mean that
any other corporation raising the same challenge would also win.75
But the Chief Justice's analysis misconstrues Citizens United's 'as-ap-
plied' challenge to the statute. One of its principle arguments was that
there should be an exception to subsection 441(b)'s ban on independent
expenditures for communication by nonprofits funded predominately
by individuals.76 Essentially, the statute, as applied to a nonprofit com-
pany like Citizens United, should fail. So any holding based on this as-
applied challenge should not and would not turn on whether corpora-
tions enjoyed the same first amendment rights as individuals, like the
72. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(writing separately to specifically "address important principles of judicial restraint and
stare decisis implicated in this case." Id. at 917).
73. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (quoting Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200
(1927)).
74. Id. at 919.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 891.
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Chief Justice claimed. A holding that the Act may not be applied to
Citizens would mean only that other nonprofit corporations would also
win, not that all other corporations would also win.
C. The De Minimis Exception for Non-Profits - An Acceptable
Ruling On The Merits
The majority could have stopped there, but simply finding in
favor of Citizens United was not the desired result. Overruling Aus-
tin's holding that the government can restrict corporate independent
expenditures in to order to fight corruption was the ultimate goal. Jus-
tice Kennedy reasoned that since Citizens United received a de
minimis amount of donations from for-profit corporations it did not
qualify for the nonprofit exception carved out in a prior case.77 It is
interesting that the record was never cited showing just how much of
the documentary Hilary was funded from for-profit donations. Even a
negligible contribution from a single for-profit company, the majority
pointed out, would still allow for-profit treasury funds to be spent in
support of a candidate, however minimal.7 8
Justice Kennedy used this rigid, self-serving logic to support the
notion that the restriction on corporate independent expenditures it-
self, at issue in Austin and addressed by McCain-Feingold, ties the
Court's hand in carving out a specific exception for nonprofits. Avoid-
ing this de minimis standard, according to the majority, is necessary to
avoid "intricate case-by-case determinations" of whether too much
money has been received from for profit organizations, thus rendering
the particular corporate political speech illegal.79 This draconian for-
malism appears to be an excuse rather than an impartial exercise in
statutory construction.
Creating an exception for de minimis donations from for-profit
corporations was well within the Court's authority. It is a matter of
settled law, that an element with only the slightest influence can be
77. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238 at 263-264 (1986) ("Our conclusion is that § 441(b)'s restriction of independent spending
is unconstitutional as applied to MCFL, for it infringes protected speech without a
compelling justification for such infringement. We acknowledge the legitimacy of Congress'
concern that organizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain
unfair advantage in the political marketplace." The Court recognizes that a nonprofit
organization is not as likely to gain the same "unfair advantage in the political
marketplace" by "amass[ing] great wealth" as a for profit corporation may).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 892.
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overlooked, especially in the name of judicial restraint.80 But instead of
overlooking such a minimal influence the Court went out of its way to
emphasize it. Instead of developing the newly created exception81 to
its logical end, the court declined "to adopt an interpretation that re-
quires intricate case-by-case determinations to verify whether political
speech is banned, especially if we are convinced that, in the end, this
corporation has a constitutional right to speak on this subject."82 This
statement clearly illustrates how the majority's predisposition for a
certain outcome, regardless of the convoluted legal maneuvering re-
quired, misses the point. It was never argued that corporations do not
have a right to speak on certain subjects, only that the government
does have a compelling interest in regulating that speech especially in
the months leading up to a federal election.
Having concluded that Citizens United's narrower arguments
could not be reconciled with a fair interpretation of the statute, the
Court could have exercised judicial restraint by affirming the district
court's decision. Instead, in the name of "judicial responsibility," the
majority struck down 441(b) and overruled Austin, fearing that "any
other course of decision would prolong the substantial nation-wide chil-
ling effect caused by 441(b). . ."83 Again, it seems as if the majority had
decided ahead of time that the statute was unconstitutional before
even beginning the constitutional analysis. So naturally, it should not
be surprising that this analysis was dubious at best.
D. "Judicial Responsibility" Trumps Objectivity
The majority claimed that Austin conflicted with the precedent
set by Bellotti and that stare decisis actually commanded overturning
it.84 Austin allegedly failed to follow Bellotti's holding that political
80. For a brief history on the de minimus maxim's first use in the English civil law see
e.g., Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and A Proposal for Its Application in Copyright,
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 949 (2006); See also Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.
1982)(city employee forced to take leave of absence while running for office alleged first
amendment violations; as to the leave of absence requirement Justice Posner noted a de
minimus exception, "The impairment of free speech brought about by the leave-of-absence
requirement is indirect and probably very slight; the benefits in preserving order, discipline,
and efficiency in public employment strike us as much greater than the cost to First
Amendment interests).
81. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986) (this case created a limited exception for certain non-profit corporations).
82. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
83. Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 912.
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speech could not be prohibited based on the speaker's identity.85 Here
again, the majority misconstrues what Austin was all about. It seems
unfair to say that Austin "contravened this Court's earlier precedents
in Buckley and Bellotti"8 6 when the Court in Austin explicitly acknowl-
edged the rule from Bellotti.8 7 The Citizens majority was either
ignorant of the Austin's Court's respect for precedent or deliberate in
mischaracterizing Austin in order to manipulate the law towards the
result they wanted-classic judicial activism. Either way, this should
be troubling and should trump any concern over corporate personhood,
as that discussion is a mere distraction.
No one in Austin suggested that speech from a corporation falls
entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment.8 8 In fact, Jus-
tice Stevens pointed out in his dissent that, "indeed, all six Members of
the Austin majority had been on the Court at the time of Bellotti, and
none so much as hinted in Austin that they saw any tension between
the decisions." 9 The Austin Court did not reject First Amendment
protection for corporate political speech introduced by the Bellotti
Court as the majority purports. Both cases are consistent with First
Amendment jurisprudence. "When a statutory provision burdens First
Amendment rights, it must be justified by a compelling state inter-
est."90 The difference is that Bellotti did not find the State's interest in
regulating independent corporate expenditures on referenda issues
compelling enough to burden the corporation's speech rights.9 1 The
Austin Court, on the other hand, found a compelling interest in "regu-
lating independent corporate expenditures on candidate elections." 92
Austin's anti-distortion rationale was compelling because of the danger
that "corporate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of
the political process. . ."93 While it is true that political speech is clearly
85. See id. at 912-13.
86. Id. at 912.
87. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (Justice
Marshall agreed with Bellotti that "the mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not
remove its speech from the ambit of the First Amendment.") overruled by Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
88. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens accused the
majority of "grasp[ing] a quotational straw from Bellotti").
89. Id.
90. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 at 256
(1986). See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 31; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963).
91. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787-792.
92. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
93. Austin, 494 U.S. at 668.
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"indispensable to decision making in a democracy,"94 it is equally true
that a functioning democracy requires the citizenry to "have faith that
[their] representatives owe their positions to the people, not to the cor-
porations with the deepest pockets."95
E. Conservative Corporate Bias
So what was really going on? The Citizens Court addressed a
broad constitutional question without being moved to do so and, in so
doing, overruled prior cases which in no way contradicted prior prece-
dent. The real story is that the make-up of the court has changed
significantly in the twenty years between Austin and Citizens, gradu-
ally becoming more conservative.9b Over the last forty years,
conservative presidents have picked eleven out of fourteen justices.97
After George W. Bush appointed John Roberts and Samuel Alito in
2006, replacing Justice Rehnquist and the moderate Justice O'Connor,
the conservative domination of the court began.98 Though difficult to
quantify, this ideological shift brought a markedly pro-corporate bias
to the court.
One way to see this pro-corporate shift is to look at the relation-
ship between the pro-business rulings of the Roberts Court and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The stated mission of the Chamber is to
take the voice of its members to Washington.9 9 Formed in 1912, Presi-
dent Taft called on the chamber's "assistance in carrying on the
government in reference to those matters that affect the business and
business welfare of the country."100 A study conducted by Lee Epstein,
William Landes, and Judge Richard Posner, 01 found that the Roberts
94. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (footnote omitted).
95. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. See generally www.oyez.org for Justice profiles, interesting statistics, and various
other resources.
97. See Nan Aron, Roberts Court Protects the Powerful, Politico (May 5, 2010), http:l
www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/36755_Page2.html.
98. See Corporations and the Court: America's Supreme Court Is The Most Business-
Friendly For Decades, THE ECONOMIST (July 23, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/
18866873.
99. U. S. Chamber of Commerce, http://www.uschamber.com/about (last visited Mar.
10, 2012) (According to its official website, "The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world's
largest business organization; representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses
of all sizes. .. ").
100. Id. (President Taft went on to say, "We do not wish to limit your discretion in that
matter. We wish that your advice should be as free and unrestricted as possible.").
101. Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago.
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Court ruled pro-business in sixty-one percent of its cases over five
terms. 102
So what are the implications of the trend? If the judiciary is the
"most important instrument for social, economic and political change,"
as Justice Powell once said, what is wrong with judicial advocacy?103 It
is arguable that without Chief Justice Earl Warren's judicial advocacy
in the fifties and sixties, the civil rights movement would not have been
as successful. 104 The problem with the Roberts brand of conservative
judicial advocacy is instead of strengthening the rights and constitu-
tional protections of the individual, it favors the business interest. The
effects of this paradigm have yet to be fully realized but considering
that Chief Justice John Roberts is the youngest Chief Justice since
John Marshall over 200 years ago,105 the potential ramifications of his
influence will persist for many years to come.
III. MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
While the effect of Citizens United has allowed corporate money
to influence the political discussion like never before, leaving the fu-
ture of campaign finance forever changed the implications of the
decision are vast and misunderstood. Is President Obama's concern
that the Court has opened the floodgates for multinational corpora-
tions with foreign shareholders to influence domestic politics a
legitimate concern or mere political rhetoric? As discussed above, Citi-
zens United did very little to expand corporate political speech rights
and, on its face, did nothing to change the current law regulating the
participation of multinational corporations in domestic politics. Fun-
damentally, all that changed after Citizens United is that a corporation
can now use its general treasury funds to finance both "issue ads" and
102. See Corporations and The Court, supra note 78, (noting fifty-one percent pro-
business rulings under Chief Justice Rehnquist and Forty-seven percent under Chief
Justice Earl Warren); See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business
Interests, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/
19roberts.html; Stephanie Mencimer, Alito: The Chamber of Commerce's Supreme Court
Ringer?, Mother Jones.com, (July 9, 2010), available at http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/
06/alito-chambers-high-court-ringer (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (noting that the most
reliable supporter of the Chamber was Justice Alito who never voted against the Chamber
in the most contested cases).
103. Liptak, supra note 93.
104. See New York Times obituary for Chief Justice Earl Warren, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/learning/generallonthisday/bday/0319.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013)
(the obituary reflects on some of the Chief Justice's most famous rulings and his impact on
civil rights).
105. OYEz, http://www.oyez.org/justices/john-g-robertsjr (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
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ads expressly advocating for the election of a specific candidate,
whereas before corporations could only finance "issue ads."106 In fact,
the Court explicitly declined to answer the question of whether
preventing foreign corporations from influencing the domestic political
process was a compelling government interest.107
Federal campaign finance law currently prohibits a "foreign na-
tional" from making independent expenditures, 0 8 which includes,
among other things, a corporation "organized under the laws of or hav-
ing its principal place of business in a foreign country." 09 Citizens
United leaves this scheme untouched, but with one caveat; the statu-
tory definition does not include the U.S. subsidy of a foreign
corporation, effectively creating a loophole for foreign companies to
participate in the political arena through PACS (and now super PACS)
created and administered solely by their U.S. subsidiaries.11 0 Since the
1970's,111 numerous Federal Election Commission (FEC) advisory
opinions112 have further crystallized this interpretation leaving no
doubt foreign corporations can, at the very least, participate and influ-
ence domestic politics in a roundabout way.113 President Obama's and
Justice Stevens' concerns appear to be more legitimate, instead of rhet-
oric, but not for the reasons that one might expect. It is this loophole
that lends credence to their fears, not some cataclysmic abdication of
106. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 19
(2012) (noting "that before Citizens United, a corporation or union could sponsor ads with its
treasury funds that said 'Tell Congressman Smith to stop destroying America.' After
Citizens United, they can add at the end, 'and, by the way, don't vote for him."' [internal
quotations omitted]).
107. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (Justice Kennedy noted, "Section 441b is not limited
to corporations or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded
predominately by foreign shareholders. Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if
we assumed, arguendo, that the Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign
influence over our political process.").
108. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2012).
109. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(3) (2006).
110. See Jeffrey K. Powell, Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions from Foreign
Sources: Questioning Their Justification in A Global Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L EcoN. L. 957, 964 (1996).
111. Since 1975 the FEC has issued over 568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of
explanations for those regulations, and 1,771 advisory opinions. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 895.
112. The passage of Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1971, as will be discussed
infra, marked the modern era of campaign finance regulations.
113. See 29 Op. Fed. Election Comn'n 2-3 (1989) (a subsidiary of a foreign corporation,
organized under U.S. laws was exempt from the ban on foreigners and could create a PAC
for contribution purposes, so long as its foreign owners did not fund or participate in the
administration of the PAC). But see 29 Op. Fed. Election Comm'n Dissent 5-6 (arguing that
the Commission's separation of the domestic subsidiary from its foreign parent, thus
creating two "separate" entities was an error).
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all prior prohibitions against foreign nationals making independent
expenditures.
A. A Century Of Campaign Finance Regulations
As will be illustrated in more detail below, the impetus for cam-
paign finance law has, to varying degrees, always been based on
concerns over corruption and the ability of the modern corporation to
engage in expensive electioneering communications. Laws dating as
far back as 1907, including the passage of the Tillman Act, have
targeted independent expenditures by domestic corporations.114 Con-
gressional concern over the influence of foreign agents begins to
surface in the 1930's with the passage of the Foreign Agent Registra-
tion Act ("FARA") and becomes clear with the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"). The next subsection will trace the
development of corporate political speech regulation, especially as it
relates to multinational corporations, from the Tillman Act through
the passage of the McCain-Feingold Act, which still regulates cam-
paign finance today, albeit in a severely diminished way after Citizens
United. The discussion will illuminate the ever-widening loophole over
the last century at the crux of the issue.
1. The Tillman Act and Taft-Hartley
To understand the potential impact of Citizens United requires
a brief understanding of the history of campaign finance regulations.
In response to the rising political influence of corporations through di-
rect contributions to candidates, Congress passed the Tillman Act of
1907115 which was the first significant federal campaign finance law
enacted in response to concerns over modern corporate wealth. 16
Forty years later, in response to the rising political influence of unions,
Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act ("Taft-Hart-
ley"). 117 Fearing potential corruption, these Acts prohibited all direct
contributions by domestic corporations and unions to any federal or
114. See discussion infra III.A.
115. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864. (See also Theodore Roosevelt,
Speech, State of the Union Address, (D.C., Dec. 3,1906), available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=29547 (last visited April 12, 2011).
116. The legislative history suggests two rationales for the Act: "preventing corrupt
practices acts" and preventing directors from using shareholders' money without consent.
See H.R. REP. No. 59-6397, at 1-2 (1907).
117. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
Informally known as the Taft-Hartley Act, the law was first codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1946) and then later, as amended, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (2006).
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state election. Taft-Hartley, however, placed no limits on a union's
ability to spend money out of a separate segregated fund, or PAC.118
While these acts set the stage for modern campaign finance regula-
tions, they addressed only domestic corporations including unions and
were concerned only with preventing quid-pro-quo corruption.
2. FARA and FECA
The first legislative enactment addressing concerns over foreign
entities manipulating U.S. policy was the Foreign Agent Registration
Act ("FARA") passed in 1938. FARA in no way limited speech by for-
eign principals but instead required all "agents of foreign principals"
located within the United States to register with the government. 119
Essentially, FARA introduced disclosure requirements for political ex-
pression by foreign principals, in an attempt to curb the influx of Axis
propaganda during World War II. It was not until 1966 that Congress
targeted foreign "political speech"120 by making it a felony for a foreign
principal to make campaign contributions through its agent.121 This
language, however, was easily exploitable, as the foreign principal
could bypass its local agent and contribute directly to a candidate.
As will become clear through the remainder of this paper, it is
these exploitations and ambiguities that have plagued campaign fi-
nance regulation since its inception, which Citizens United most
significantly impacts. In an attempt to clarify the existing law, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") in 1971.122
FECA prohibited all political contributions and expenditures made
from a corporate or union PAC in an attempt to diminish the loophole
left open by Taft-Hartley. 123 1n Pipefitters Local Union 562 v. U.S., de-
118. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 511-512
(2007).
119. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1) (West).
120. Recall that the Buckley court later equated speech with money, supra note 15, at 2.
121. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) (West) (corresponds to 80 Stat. 244, 244 (2006)) (defining the
"agent of a foreign principal" as any person who acts "under the direction or control, of a
foreign principal or of a person. . . directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled,
financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal." Business
associations that are organized in the U.S. are not classified as foreign principals. 22 U.S.C.
§ 611(b)(2)).
122. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 399 (1972).
123. Under Taft-Hartley, unions could circumvent this restriction on direct
contributions by contributing unlimited funds from their general treasury. See, e.g., Sean
Saval, Corporations United: Reassessing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission to
Propose That Political Speech Regulations of for-Profit Corporations Should Be Given the
Same Reduced Judicial Scrutiny As Commercial Speech, 41 STETSON L. REV. 175, 181-83
(2011).
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cided a year later, the court held that Taft-Hartley "does not apply to
union contributions and expenditures from political funds financed in
some sense by the voluntary donations of employees."124 Before 1972, it
was unclear whether unions could use their general treasury funds to
contribute to their PACs, but after FECA and Pipefitters, it became
clear that union political contributions or expenditures were only law-
ful if employees or union members freely and knowingly donated
money to the PAC. 125 This does nothing to close the loophole and in-
stead, as Justice Powell opined in his dissent in Pipefitters, "[tihe
opinion of the Court provides a blueprint for compliance [with the stat-
ute].. .which will be welcomed by every corporation and union which
wishes to take advantage of. . .[the] opportunity to influence elec-
tions . .. "126
3. 1974 FECA Amendments
Congress next amended FECA in 1974, after the Watergate
scandal revealed how foreign principals exploited the gaping loophole
left open by FARA. 127 The 1974 Amendments placed limits on individ-
ual campaign contributions and expenditures 28 and eventually led to
the creation of the FEC.129 Most importantly, for the purposes of the
current discussion, the amendments explicitly prohibited foreign na-
tionals from making any campaign contributions in any election for the
first time.130 Eventually re-codified as 2 U.S.C. § 441(e), this provision
currently retains the same prohibitions under what remains of the Mc-
Cain-Feingold regime, as the original enactment in 1974.
124. Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 409 [emphasis added].
125. Id. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 448-449 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in Translation: Preventing Foreign
Influence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 951, 972
(2011); See, e.g., Id. at n. 129 for further discussion regarding secret donations allegedly
made to President Nixon by various foreign entities, including Amerada Hess and the Shah
of Iran as well as other Arab interests.
128. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,7 (1976) (Capping individual donations at "$1,000 to
any single candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any
contributor. . .").
129. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974). The Amendment passed unanimously, 89-0. 120 Cong. Rec. 8786. It was not
until the 1976 Amendments, however, that enforcement of the ban fell under the
jurisdiction of the FEC.
130. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 88 Stat. 1263; See Vega,
supra at n. 116.
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4. McCain-Feingold
The McCain-Feingold Act1 31 currently regulates corporate cam-
paign financing and was intended to eliminate any remaining
loopholes. Passed partially in response to the Enron scandal, this en-
actment was the largest overhaul to campaign finance regulation since
Watergate. 132 As discussed above, however, Citizens United substan-
tially gutted the act by invalidating its primary provision prohibiting
corporations and unions from making independent expenditures ex-
pressly advocating for the election or defeat of an identifiable
candidate.133 The Court also struck down the provision prohibiting
electioneering communications during a specified blackout period. The
only significant provisions that remain are the century's old ban on
direct campaign contributions made from general corporate treasury
funds, the maximum limits on direct contributions, and various disclo-
sure requirements.
B. Foreign Owned Corporations And Their U.S. Subsidiaries
Citizens United did not expand or extend any new First Amend-
ment rights to foreign entities or multinational corporations, nor did it
overturn current regulations regarding multinational corporations' in-
dependent expenditures. The danger of foreign influence, however, is
still conceivable and stems from the Court ripping open the loopholes
McCain-Feingold was meant to close. Though 441(e)'s prohibition on a
foreign national's contribution to any domestic election remains intact,
subsequent interpretations by the FEC have cemented the exemptions
available to foreign-controlled or -owned domestic corporations. 3 4
Before Citizens, a corporation, including a foreign corporation's U.S.
subsidiary, could spend unlimited funds only on nonpartisan activities
like "get-out-the-vote" drives or general issue ads.1 3 5 After Citizens, a
corporation, including a foreign corporation's U.S. subsidiary, can now
131. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81
(2002).
132. Alison Mitchell, Enron's Woe's Revive Debate on Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/22/us/enron-s-woes-revive-debate-on-campaigns.
html.
133. See Kang, supra note 103 for more information on the issue of ads versus express
advocacy ads.
134. See supra note 110 (". . .a corporation organized under the law [of] any state within
the United States whose principal place of business is within the United States is not a
foreign principal and, accordingly, would not be a foreign national under 2 U.S.C. §441e.");
See, e.g., Vega, supra note 116, at 976-977.
135. See e.g., Kang, supra note 103.
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make unlimited independent expenditures for a greater number of par-
tisan-based reasons, including express advocacy ads and electioneering
communications. The real unsettling outcome of Citizens United is
this: the disintegration of thirty-six years of prohibitions on indepen-
dent expenditures by foreign corporations, first introduced through the
1974 FECA amendments. Leaving no spending limits in place and no
regulations of independent expenditures generally speaking, any do-
mestic corporation or U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation can now
maximize its exploitation of the loophole Congress has been trying to
close for over a hundred years.
While the true extent of the multinational corporation's influ-
ence on domestic politics since 2010 has yet to be seen, there are recent
examples of how powerful such an influence was pre-Citizen, which
counsels caution as the campaign finance reform saga continues into
the post-Citizens world. Take British Petroleum ("BP") and its influ-
ence in 2009, the year before the Deepwater Horizon oilrig exploded.
This foreign company, through its U.S. subsidiary's PAC, donated over
$1 million dollars to U.S. political candidates and causes.13 6 A report
to the President discussing the cause of the disaster concluded that
"pockets of corruption" likely played a role in the lax enforcement by
the Minerals Management Services. 13 7 Since the McCain Feingold re-
gime was in full effect at the time of the apparent corruption, it is
incongruous to assume that after Citizens corruption will suddenly be
any more (or less) rampant than before. Corruption, by its nature, is
amorphous and unlikely to go away even with well-crafted, and well
intentioned, legislative pronouncements.
According to OpenSecrets.org, a website which attempts to keep
track of how money flows through U. S. politics, contributions from
BP's PAC were lower in 2010 than during previous years. 13 8 During
the 2012 election cycle, the first full election cycle after Citizens
United, BP's PAC received about the same amount of contributions but
spent almost $200,000 more on contributions and independent expend-
itures.139 . While correlation does not imply causation, the almost 66%
rise in PAC money spent on the 2012 election cycle also shows, at a
136. See Vega, supra note 123, at 957 (this total does not conclude the $16 million spent
lobbying Congress, which is beyond the scope of this discussion).
137. Id. See also Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (2011),
available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER
ReporttothePresident FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
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minimum, how the BP PAC likely took advantage of the post Citizens
freedom to spend as much money as desired on independent expendi-
tures of various kinds. Does this correlate to a rise in corruption?
Maybe not, as according to a blog on OpenSecrets.org, many politicians
seeking to distance themselves from the company actually refused con-
tributions from the PAC in 2010, but only time will tell. 140 Maybe the
people's perception of corruption, and their disdain for it, is enough to
prevent bribery and greed from high jacking the system and all that is
needed is an angry and active citizenry. Although it is difficult to draw
any concrete conclusions from this example, it illustrates at least one
thing: the ability of a foreign corporation to assert some kind of influ-
ence on domestic political affairs through its U. S. subsidiary. The
extent of that influence, whether real or perceived, dangerous or innoc-
uous, is a question for another day.
C. The United States Chamber of Commerce
For an example post Citizens, one need only look to the 2010
midterm elections and the United States Chamber of Commerce. The
Chamber ran attack ads targeting individual candidates, funded in
part by contributions from foreign corporations. 14 1 Like Citizens
United, the Chamber of Commerce is organized as a nonprofit, so
before the Citizens Court struck down most of McCain-Feingold, use of
its general treasury funds on independent expenditures like these ad-
vocacy ads would have been illegal, regardless of where the
contributions came from. Now, however, the Chamber is free to run
any kind of ad its supporters so desire. The Chamber has also stepped-
up its fundraising efforts, receiving donations from multiple countries,
including Saudia Arabia and the Kingdom of Bahrain, as well as from
some multinational corporations including BP.142 In a post-Citizens
world it would seem that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce could become
an increasingly vociferous advocate for foreign business interests.
The history of campaign finance reveals a long running concern
over both the influence of corporations and of foreign nationals in do-
140. Michael Beckel, Federal Contributions from Political Action Committee of
Beleaguered Oil Giant BP Slow to a Trickle, accessible at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2010/07/federal-contributions-from-politica.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
141. See Lee Fang, Exclusive: Foreign-Funded 'U.S.' Chamber of Commerce Running
Partisan Attack Ads, THiNK PROGRESS (Oct. 5, 2010), http://thinkprogress.org/2010/10/05/
foreign-chamber-commerce/ (divulging the Chamber of Commerce's pledge to spend
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mestic politics. Starting with the Tillman Act, Congress has attempted
to regulate direct contributions from large corporate coffers; however,
corporations, union, and foreign nationals continued to exploit loop-
holes in the law. First, they used money from their general treasuries
to make independent expenditures through their PACs. 143 Later, for-
eign nationals continued to bypass their local agents, contributing
directly to candidates they supported until Watergate illuminated this
blatant loophole. 144 Finally in the 1970s, laws imposed disclosure re-
quirements, limits on spending, and prohibitions against independent
expenditures for electioneering communications and express advocacy
ads. Other restrictions made it illegal for foreign nationals to contrib-
ute to domestic political campaigns; however, a glaring loophole still
allowed U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned or -controlled corporations
to contribute to the political discussion through their PAC. Ultimately,
Citizens United removed such restrictions on independent expendi-
tures, thereby rendering the distinction between issue ads and express
advocacy moot. To be sure, this opened door for all domestic corpora-
tions or U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations to make unlimited
independent expenditures on any kind of political speech through their
PAC. While the extent of foreign corruption and corporate influence in
the future is uncertain, in light of the Deepwater Horizon accident and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's actions in the 2010-midterm elec-
tions, it is clear the danger is very real.
IV. SECOND AMENDMENT - A BRIEF ACADEMIC EXERCISE
The 2009 term, beginning with the controversial Citizens
United, ended with McDonald v. City of Chicago, which held that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is incorporated within the con-
cept of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 145
Taken together, these two cases imply that a corporation has some, if
not all, Second Amendment rights.
The purpose of the two amendments is essentially the same: to
advance self-determination and liberty. The First Amendment protec-
tion of free speech is "premised on mistrust of governmental power"146
and serves as an important check on government power. There is a
143. See supra note 127.
144. See supra note 127.
145. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025, 3040 (2010).
146. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (the Court goes on to
note that, "the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects. . . or
allowing speech by some but not others.").
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logical parallel in the Second Amendment that is fundamentally about
self-defense. 14 7 The McDonald Court was fearful that tyranny would
thrive if the government had "a monopoly on the tools (if not also the
legitimacy) of violence." 148 The Citizens Court was concerned that
prohibitions on speech based upon the speaker's corporate identity
would give the government a monopoly over the political conversation
and the open market place of ideas. 14 9 If subsection 441(b) were ap-
plied to individuals most would agree that it would be an
impermissible ban on speech.150 Considering that the Citizens Court
focused solely on the purpose of the right and not on the identity of the
person asserting the right so as to avoid government control of con-
tent,15 1 it follows that the distinction between a corporate person and a
natural purpose would also not be relevant in the context of the Second
Amendment.
Before concluding that Second Amendment protections extend
to corporate persons in the same manner as natural persons, consider-
ation of Justice Powell's test from Bellotti1 52 is necessary. By focusing
the question on what speech is covered by the First Amendment and
not on what speaker is protected, the Citizens Court implicitly recog-
nized that the right was not "purely personal" and was therefore
consistent with precedent. Whether the Second Amendment right is,
"purely personal" or "unavailable to corporations for some other rea-
son," depends on the nature, history and purpose" of the right to bear
arms.153
147. McDonald, 561 U.S. 3025 (discussing the Second Amendment as a fundamental
right to self-defense).
148. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 904-05 (2011); accord District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) ("When the able-bodied men of a nation are
trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny."); see also McDonald,
130 S. Ct. at 3043 (discussing the concern during Reconstruction that the only persons able
to possess weapons were police and militia forces).
149. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
150. Id. at 898.
151. Id. ("Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands
against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints."); See, e.g., United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (striking down content-based
restriction); Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others; See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 784 (1978) ("As instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content.").
152. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-79, n. 14 (1978).
153. Id.
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The fact that the fundamental purpose of the right to keep and bear
arms was for self-defense, and is therefore by its very nature, personal
is not dispositive. A simple textual analysis reveals the Second
Amendment contemplates both a personal and collective character. 154
The framers intense fear of tyranny also reinforces the collective na-
ture of the right. Self-defense can be collective in the sense that the
people maintain the right to keep and bear arms as a safeguard
against a "tyrannical government."155 Communal protection, just as
the ability to amplify political speech through an association of people,
is thus at the core of the Second Amendment protections, and therefore
the right is not purely personal. In order to prevent governmental dom-
ination of the political discourse, speech cannot be prohibited based on
the speaker's corporate identity. Accordingly, it makes sense that the
right to keep and bear arms cannot be limited based on the corporate
identity of the 'person' (or more accurately, the association of persons)
asserting the Second Amendment right, in order to prevent govern-
mental domination over the "tools of violence." It is this notion of self-
determination that empowers the citizenry to restrain unmitigated
governmental power that lies at the foundation of both the First and
Second Amendments. This purpose is realized to the same extent
whether manifest in the aggregate or individually.
V. APPLYING CITIZENS UNITED
In December of 2011, three Montana corporations sued in dis-
trict court seeking a declaration that Montana's 100 year old law
regulating campaign finance in state politics was no longer constitu-
tional in light ofCitizens United.15 6 Like the provisions at issue in
Citizens, the Wisconsin statute also prohibited corporate independent
expenditures in connection with any candidate or political party.15 7
Mechanically applying the rule from Citizens that first amendment
protections extend to corporations, the district court invalidated the
Montana law without analyzing whether a compelling interest existed
154. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
155. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008); See also McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (referring to self-defense as the "central component"
of the Second Amendment).
156. W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of State, 363 Mont. 220, 226, 271 P.3d 1,
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on the facts of that case.158 The Montana Supreme Court, however, re-
versed the district court, noting some crucial distinctions.
The Montana Supreme Court observed that the government in
Citizens United had never claimed "that corporate expenditures had
actually corrupted the political process and it was because of this lack
of evidence that the Citizens Court concluded that 'independent ex-
penditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption."' 159 Without actual evi-
dence of corruption the proffered justification for the federal
restrictions on corporate speech could not stand. The burden to prove
whether a compelling interest exists rests with the government, and in
Citizens the government failed to meet its burden. 6 0 In the case of
Western Tradition Partnership, however, the Montana State Supreme
Court held that the state had fully met its burden in proving the exis-
tence of corruption, and thus found an interest compelling enough to
justify the ban on "corporate speech" through independent
expenditures.1 6 1
The Western Tradition Partnership Court emphasized that Citi-
zens United did not disturb traditional first amendment jurisprudence
requiring a strict scrutiny analysis for any law that burdens political
speech.162 Justice Kennedy even acknowledged in Citizens that if
"elected officials do succumb to improper influences from independent
expenditures 'then surely there is cause for concern."1 63 After the
state presented evidence of systemic political corruption as a result of
large concentrations of corporate wealth, the Montana Supreme Court
concluded that where evidence of actual corruption was lacking in Citi-
zens United, it was overwhelming in the current case.
In a single paragraph, per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court
of the United States flatly rejected the Montana Supreme Court's anal-
ysis.16 4 While the factual distinctions explicated by Western Tradition
Partnership may not be quite as compelling as that court reasoned, 65
158. Id. at 226.
159. Id. at 227 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 229-40.
162. Id. at 227.
163. Id. (quoting Citizens United at 348).
164. Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 1307 (2012).
165. W. Tradition Pship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of State, 363 Mont. 220, 229-40 271 P.3d
(the evidence of political corruption seems more akin to the quid pro corruption rampant
across most states in the early 1900's; one example of corruption is that of a wealthy
industrialist with his sights on the United States Senate. "In 1899, in the wake of a large
number of suddenly affluent members, the Montana Legislature elected Clark to the U.S.
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there is a sense that the conservative majority has again stood its
ground in refusing to thoroughly and objectively scrutinize the Western
Tradition Partnership Court's logic. Though a per curiam opinion is
one given "by the court" anonymously it is not necessarily unanimous.
Justice Breyer's dissent, in American Tradition Partnership joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan clearly implicates who au-
thored the holding, that same corporately biased majority responsible
for Citizens United.166
While Justice Kennedy's proclamation that "an outright ban on
corporate political speech during the critical pre-election period is not a
permissible remedy"167 may be difficult to overcome in future chal-
lenges, it might not be impossible. By not unequivocally refuting the
Montana Supreme Court's traditional First Amendment analysis there
is one thing to be gleaned from Western Tradition Partnership: it may
still be possible to place limits or outright bans on independent corpo-
rate expenditures if there is clear evidence of actual corruption directly
caused by the independent expenditures. Until the Supreme Court
thoroughly analyzes how a lower court may apply Citizens United to
different factual circumstances1 6 8 it is impossible to predict just how
far reaching this decision may be. And that is not likely to happen
unless the makeup of the Court changes or the conservative majority
abandons its predispositions and returns to its duty to safeguard the
rights of every individual.
VI. CONCLUSION
Part I explored the genesis of the popular notion of corporate
personhood and concluded that corporations should be given Four-
teenth Amendment protections when it comes to safeguarding their
property rights. This is well reasoned, considering that corporations
exist merely to aggregate wealth, which is essentially property. Corpo-
rate personhood, however, was not controlling in Citizens United. Part
II broke down the majority's approach, revealing where it went wrong.
The majority, sua sponte, broadened the constitutional question by
Senate. Clark admitted to spending $272,000 in the effort .. . Complaints of Clark's bribery
of the Montana Legislature led to an investigation by the U.S. Senate in 1900. The Senate
investigating committee concluded that Clark had won his seat through bribery and
unseated him. The Senate committee 'expressed horror at the amount of money which had
been poured into politics in Montana elections . . . and expressed its concern with respect to
the general aura of corruption in Montana.'" Id. at 231).
166. Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 1307 (2012).
167. Citizens United, sapra note 1, at 348.
168. Id.
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turning Citizens United's contention from an applied challenge into a
facial challenge. The majority then rejected Citizens' narrower argu-
ments, including a legitimate argument that Citizens United qualified
for a nonprofit exception. In the process, the Court struck down Aus-
tin's rationale that corporate independent expenditures could give rise
to corruption and held unconstitutional section 441(b) of McCain-Fein-
gold's prohibition on independent expenditures for electioneering
communications and express advocacy advertisements. Part II also ex-
plored the conservative bias of the majority of the court and their
reckless use of judicial activism to obtain a result they desired, disre-
garding sound and longstanding constitutional principles of judicial
restraint. Part III traced the origins of modern campaign finance law
to show how Citizens United enlarged a longstanding loophole in cam-
paign finance law-that U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations could
contribute through funds maintained in a separate fund, or PAC.
The real danger is not the Citizens Court's degradation of the
entire campaign finance regime, as unsettling as that may be, but it is
in the conservative justices' approach. It is important to note that Jus-
tice Ginsburg will be eighty-three years old by the end of the 2013
presidential term.169 She has served for over eighteen years, 170 and
considering the average length of a Supreme Court Justice's tenure is
sixteen years,171 it is likely that President Obama will have the honor
of appointing a new Justice. The integrity of the Court is at stake. If
the next appointee has a history of corporate bias and is willing to ma-
nipulate the law, distorting truth, at the whim of his or her corporate
allegiance, the very foundation of our form of government will crum-
ble. If a student of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito is
appointed, the conservative domination of the court will threaten to
destroy the concept of separation of powers.
This new judicial dictatorship will answer only to their corpo-
rate masters. They will move according to their own biased passions
and not as objective guardians of the people's most scared rights.
There will be nothing left t to check the power of the modern corpora-
tion as individual rights and liberties guaranteed to the people by the
Constitution are transferred to the "corptacracy." Corporations with
their vast coffers will eventually drown out the people's voice, the cres-
169. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, http://
www.oyez.org/justices/ruth bader-ginsburg (last visited April 26, 2012) (Justice Ginsburg
was born March 15, 1933, so in January of 2017 she will be just shy of 84).
170. Id. (Justice Ginsburg was sworn in on August 9, 1993).
171. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
faqjustices.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2012).
188
2012 THE MODERN JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP 189
cendo rendering any meaningful participation in the open market
place of ideas by an individual futile. Eventually there will be no
America, no democracy, only GM, and BP, and Wal-Mart, and other
nationless business conglomerates.
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